Many people believe that libertarianism can be best understood in terms of the idea of free-market capitalism. It is usually held that liberals endorse particular government restrictions on individuals by taxation and the like. Libertarians oppose government restrictions on individual freedoms.
Will Kymlicka claims that every claim about freedom must possess a triadic structure- 'X is free from Y to do Z', where X is the agent, Y specifies the preventing conditions and Z specifies the action. In other words, "who is free to do what from what obstacle."
Anthony Flew believes that individuals have the right to dispose of property as they see fit but he does not state who has this right in the first place. This is a major problem for him because although the owner of a property is enjoying increased freedom, there are others who are not.
This brings us back to Robert Nozick's famous Amy and Ben argument. In this argument, Amy and Ben are both living off the resources of a particular land. One day, Amy decides that she is going to appropriate all of the land for herself. Obviously, Ben loses his freedom to reap the benefits of the land, once held in common.
In general, this means that private ownership for a particular individual simultaneously implies non-ownership for other individuals. Therefore, this ownership argument also restricts particular freedoms. G.A Cohen claims that private ownership redistributes, "freedom and unfreedom".
Cohen provides a devastating critique of Nozick's theory. By showing that both private ownership and the welfare-state both restrict particular individual freedoms. Nozick believes that his theory is superior to John Rawl's theory of liberal egalitarianism because Rawls' theory involves constant interference from the government. However, as Cohen points out, Nozick's theory itself is the problem because private ownership violates others individual freedom.
Kymlicka believes that most libertarians do not believe that free-market capitalism creates more freedom than it takes away. Libertarians will claim that capitalism does not create restrictions on any one individual. He believes they claim this because they have shifted to a moralized definition of freedom. This type of freedom refers to the 'exercise of one's rights.' Thus, they argue, the free market increases freedom in the moralized sense rather the non-moralized sense which can produce 'freedom' and 'unfreedom'.
However, with the moralized view of freedom, libertarians can claim that a private owner is not interfering with another individuals' freedom but rather they are simply claiming that it prevents these other individuals from doing what they had no right to do in the first place. The problem with this is that this argument is not liberty based but rather, it assumes the existence of rights prior to liberty. This can only be true if we view such rights as morally correct, which has not been done.
Kymlicka believes that once we define liberty in terms of the rights we can exercise, then liberty cannot cannot play a role in determining which theory is correct. Both theories can claim that their particular government institutions will act in accordance with people's moral rights is not limiting moralized liberty. Thus, if we endorse the libertarian view that people have a moral right to private property, then capitalism involves no restriction on liberty. On the other hand, if we endorse the liberal view that people do not have a right to benefit from their undeserved talents, then the redistribution of these talents does not involve a restriction on liberty as well. The answer, according to Kymlica, is that we do not need an increased amount of liberty but rather "we must first choose between their accounts of our moral rights."
9/5/08
8/18/08
Modern Civic Engagement
Many theorists concerned with the idea of ‘citizenship’ have trouble explaining the proper implementation of their ideas in the promotion of 'active citizenship'. These types of problems arise because, unlike ancient Greek or Roman times, modern citizens who do not see their involvement in politics as a necessary part of their identity or life. In other words, modern citizens may not see the incentive in their participation in politics because their individual impact will be minimal or irrelevant. Thus, it is easy to see why modern citizens can become disenfranchised and feel marginalized. The point is that it is difficult for modern citizens in a liberal democratic society to see their direct impact and easy to see why many are 'passive' rather than 'active' citizens.
Modern citizens differ from other citizens of the past because their identity is not directly tied to the political process. For example, politics will not define modern citizen but rather it is simply one of his or her many pursuits or interests. Active participation in the political process is not required of every individual in modern democracies and this further confirms the assumption that a single citizen cannot directly effect the political process.
Iris Young uses her example of a heterogeneous public, which would only be possible if every citizen possesses ‘public spiritedness.’ In other words, every citizen must be open to new ideas and perspectives which may be radically different than their own. These citizens must first be willing to participate. This is no easy undertaking. What makes the situation worse is that even if this ideal political setting was implemented, it would not necessarily ensure the active participation of the citizens in that setting.
This had led many contemporary political philosophers to analyze the necessary virtues a citizen must possess to promote this idea of active citizenship. Many of these philosophers have strongly emphasized the need for ‘public reasonableness,’ which means the ability to properly convey one’s beliefs while at the same time remaining open and sensitive to others beliefs. This includes a general willingness to listen to what may seem like absurd or even comical political beliefs.
Furthermore, if an individual does possess ‘public reasonableness,’ he or she must be able to distinguish between 'public' and 'private' beliefs. By ‘public’ beliefs I mean beliefs which directly effect the well being of the public at large in purely practical terms. For example, individuals of particular faiths have different belief systems but these ideas to not directly effect the well being of the public at large. To be more precise, health care, education, sports, civic engagement are public matters and should be deal with through a more ‘public perspective.’ These important matters should be considered more cautiously and empathetically and not selfishly. This requires an active engagement in politics and knowledge of the different cultures and beliefs involved.
I am not claiming that religious matters are irrelevant or that citizens do not have the right to religious expression. I am claiming that citizens should be aware that modern cultures are more diverse and pluralistic. Many countries in the world have progressively become more diverse. Thus, if citizens in these diverse countries and nations do not possess a certain amount public reasonableness, then their democracies may lead to tyranny and oppression. The idea of democracy requires a threshold of active citizens. This threshold is subjective but rather the point should be made that a certain number of "active" citizens are required for democracy to exist.
The virtues required of citizens in a modern democracy are usually referred to as ‘civic virtues.’ These virtues have naturally led many contemporary philosophers to re-emphasize the importance of education and its role in providing citizens with these important virtues.
Moreover, the idea that every citizen in a given society can possess public reasonableness is optimistic. I will not argue about the innate nature of human beings but it remains clear that societies obviously differ in their moral, political, philosophical, religious, sexual, cultural, artistic and conventional beliefs. The main thing to gather from this discussion is that this idea of civic engagement is extremely complex.
For the most part, citizens of modern democracy’s are less likely to meet in town halls, participate in a protest or even vote. These are only some of the core features of a democratic society. If citizens cannot see the effects of their active participation, then their desire to participate will substantially diminish. In turn, these citizens are less likely to see political involvement as a necessary part of their lives. Many of these citizens look to nationalism for a sense of identity and community.
Post-nationalists see nationalism as contingent and unnecessary for a functioning democracy. In other words, if a nation is truly democratic, then it can free itself from its history. They argue that not only is this possible but morally and pragmatically necessary to ensure the survival of democracy in a given society.
Historically, governments have used nationalism to mobilize its citizens by focusing on a given nation’s language, culture or history. However, modern democracies and other societies have become more diverse. This means that governments cannot use the idea of a shared sense of language or history to mobilize its citizens because a modern citizens’ share different languages and backgrounds.
This point shows how complex this idea of public reasonableness actually is because it raises many important questions. For example, if modern citizens share different languages, then how does the nation conduct political dialoges that are essential for democracy? Would it not be easier to simply implement a more common and universal language to promote these types of dialogs within and between various nations? This idea of a ‘common’ or ‘universal’ language is another example of the need for the differentiation between public and private beliefs. In other words, it is in a citizen’s public interest to learn the necessary common or universal language but against their private interests in maintaining their culture. The point is that the public interest should outweigh the private interest because it promotes commonality, empathy and more importantly democracy.
Modern democracies cannot sustain themselves if they continue to use nationalism as their means of mobilization to facilitate political participation. Many political philosophers have emphasized human rights as a natural progression from a more nationalistic conception of a democratic society. The majority can no longer impose its will on the minority because nations are more diverse. Thus, it is necessary to allow individual fractions within these societies to develop and formulate their own conceptions of the 'good' and 'just'. Eventually, along with a certain degree of public reasonableness, these different conceptions will evolve into universalism. Jurgen Habermas called this ‘constitutional patriotism’ because these different conceptions will be epitomized in a nations’ constitution. Finally, he argues that constitutional patriotism should replace nationalism.
The political process of democracy can reduce or eliminate the need for a commonality among its citizens. Habermas argues that because democracy is not tied to any particular culture, belief system or otherwise, it is alterable and adaptable to any culture and belief. This idea places the democratic political process on a pedestal. However, this emphasis on the democratic political process presupposes the existence of an active citizenry. Without an active citizenry, the democratic political process will cease to be representative and thus cease to be democratic.
To ensure the functionality of a democracy, citizens must see the idea of ‘citizenship’ as essential. These modern citizens must not only see active citizenship, along with ‘public reasonableness’, as essential for political rights but also essential in a social and cultural sense as well.
Liberal nationalists on the other hand believe that a successful democracy is only possible if its citizens are already enjoying mutual trust and respect. These types of welfare policies that democratic institutions are supposed to provide assistance to citizens in need. In other words, these policies can only be implemented if its citizens support these types of policies. This assumption arises out of empathy because a citizen would hope to receive the same type of assistance if they were ever in need of such assistance.
Moreover, liberal nationalist believe that it is not essential to remove a democracy’s history. They believe that this possibility is theoretically easy to say, yet much harder to accomplish. Furthermore, they do admit that although the existence of a democracy and it’s history are merely contingent and circumstantial, this does not necessarily mean we should erase or disassociate such a history. To simply assume that it is possible to eliminate a society’s history is to overstate the differentiation between politics and its cultural influence.
In any case, the majority will always feel uneasy in dealing with minorities. This does not imply that we should simply do away or neglect these minorities but rather provide a ‘thin conception of nationhood.’ Many have proposed a thin conception of nationhood which, whether post-nationalist or liberal nationalist, is adaptable and open to change. What is agreed upon is that citizens should be able to deliberate in public settings, which allows for a constant re-evaluation of a democracy’s goals and identity.
This idea of a thin conception of nationhood may not be too different from the post-nationalist because both focus on a commonality and integration. In contrast, liberal nationalists believe that culture cannot be easily removed from the political process. They are skeptical that democratic institutions alone can increase the level of active participation among its citizens. In other words, they claim that a shared sense of cultural identity is not necessary but rather is directly linked to the political process. Without a cultural identity it is difficult to assume that democratic institutions alone will produce an active citizenry.
Modern citizens differ from other citizens of the past because their identity is not directly tied to the political process. For example, politics will not define modern citizen but rather it is simply one of his or her many pursuits or interests. Active participation in the political process is not required of every individual in modern democracies and this further confirms the assumption that a single citizen cannot directly effect the political process.
Iris Young uses her example of a heterogeneous public, which would only be possible if every citizen possesses ‘public spiritedness.’ In other words, every citizen must be open to new ideas and perspectives which may be radically different than their own. These citizens must first be willing to participate. This is no easy undertaking. What makes the situation worse is that even if this ideal political setting was implemented, it would not necessarily ensure the active participation of the citizens in that setting.
This had led many contemporary political philosophers to analyze the necessary virtues a citizen must possess to promote this idea of active citizenship. Many of these philosophers have strongly emphasized the need for ‘public reasonableness,’ which means the ability to properly convey one’s beliefs while at the same time remaining open and sensitive to others beliefs. This includes a general willingness to listen to what may seem like absurd or even comical political beliefs.
Furthermore, if an individual does possess ‘public reasonableness,’ he or she must be able to distinguish between 'public' and 'private' beliefs. By ‘public’ beliefs I mean beliefs which directly effect the well being of the public at large in purely practical terms. For example, individuals of particular faiths have different belief systems but these ideas to not directly effect the well being of the public at large. To be more precise, health care, education, sports, civic engagement are public matters and should be deal with through a more ‘public perspective.’ These important matters should be considered more cautiously and empathetically and not selfishly. This requires an active engagement in politics and knowledge of the different cultures and beliefs involved.
I am not claiming that religious matters are irrelevant or that citizens do not have the right to religious expression. I am claiming that citizens should be aware that modern cultures are more diverse and pluralistic. Many countries in the world have progressively become more diverse. Thus, if citizens in these diverse countries and nations do not possess a certain amount public reasonableness, then their democracies may lead to tyranny and oppression. The idea of democracy requires a threshold of active citizens. This threshold is subjective but rather the point should be made that a certain number of "active" citizens are required for democracy to exist.
The virtues required of citizens in a modern democracy are usually referred to as ‘civic virtues.’ These virtues have naturally led many contemporary philosophers to re-emphasize the importance of education and its role in providing citizens with these important virtues.
Moreover, the idea that every citizen in a given society can possess public reasonableness is optimistic. I will not argue about the innate nature of human beings but it remains clear that societies obviously differ in their moral, political, philosophical, religious, sexual, cultural, artistic and conventional beliefs. The main thing to gather from this discussion is that this idea of civic engagement is extremely complex.
For the most part, citizens of modern democracy’s are less likely to meet in town halls, participate in a protest or even vote. These are only some of the core features of a democratic society. If citizens cannot see the effects of their active participation, then their desire to participate will substantially diminish. In turn, these citizens are less likely to see political involvement as a necessary part of their lives. Many of these citizens look to nationalism for a sense of identity and community.
Post-nationalists see nationalism as contingent and unnecessary for a functioning democracy. In other words, if a nation is truly democratic, then it can free itself from its history. They argue that not only is this possible but morally and pragmatically necessary to ensure the survival of democracy in a given society.
Historically, governments have used nationalism to mobilize its citizens by focusing on a given nation’s language, culture or history. However, modern democracies and other societies have become more diverse. This means that governments cannot use the idea of a shared sense of language or history to mobilize its citizens because a modern citizens’ share different languages and backgrounds.
This point shows how complex this idea of public reasonableness actually is because it raises many important questions. For example, if modern citizens share different languages, then how does the nation conduct political dialoges that are essential for democracy? Would it not be easier to simply implement a more common and universal language to promote these types of dialogs within and between various nations? This idea of a ‘common’ or ‘universal’ language is another example of the need for the differentiation between public and private beliefs. In other words, it is in a citizen’s public interest to learn the necessary common or universal language but against their private interests in maintaining their culture. The point is that the public interest should outweigh the private interest because it promotes commonality, empathy and more importantly democracy.
Modern democracies cannot sustain themselves if they continue to use nationalism as their means of mobilization to facilitate political participation. Many political philosophers have emphasized human rights as a natural progression from a more nationalistic conception of a democratic society. The majority can no longer impose its will on the minority because nations are more diverse. Thus, it is necessary to allow individual fractions within these societies to develop and formulate their own conceptions of the 'good' and 'just'. Eventually, along with a certain degree of public reasonableness, these different conceptions will evolve into universalism. Jurgen Habermas called this ‘constitutional patriotism’ because these different conceptions will be epitomized in a nations’ constitution. Finally, he argues that constitutional patriotism should replace nationalism.
The political process of democracy can reduce or eliminate the need for a commonality among its citizens. Habermas argues that because democracy is not tied to any particular culture, belief system or otherwise, it is alterable and adaptable to any culture and belief. This idea places the democratic political process on a pedestal. However, this emphasis on the democratic political process presupposes the existence of an active citizenry. Without an active citizenry, the democratic political process will cease to be representative and thus cease to be democratic.
To ensure the functionality of a democracy, citizens must see the idea of ‘citizenship’ as essential. These modern citizens must not only see active citizenship, along with ‘public reasonableness’, as essential for political rights but also essential in a social and cultural sense as well.
Liberal nationalists on the other hand believe that a successful democracy is only possible if its citizens are already enjoying mutual trust and respect. These types of welfare policies that democratic institutions are supposed to provide assistance to citizens in need. In other words, these policies can only be implemented if its citizens support these types of policies. This assumption arises out of empathy because a citizen would hope to receive the same type of assistance if they were ever in need of such assistance.
Moreover, liberal nationalist believe that it is not essential to remove a democracy’s history. They believe that this possibility is theoretically easy to say, yet much harder to accomplish. Furthermore, they do admit that although the existence of a democracy and it’s history are merely contingent and circumstantial, this does not necessarily mean we should erase or disassociate such a history. To simply assume that it is possible to eliminate a society’s history is to overstate the differentiation between politics and its cultural influence.
In any case, the majority will always feel uneasy in dealing with minorities. This does not imply that we should simply do away or neglect these minorities but rather provide a ‘thin conception of nationhood.’ Many have proposed a thin conception of nationhood which, whether post-nationalist or liberal nationalist, is adaptable and open to change. What is agreed upon is that citizens should be able to deliberate in public settings, which allows for a constant re-evaluation of a democracy’s goals and identity.
This idea of a thin conception of nationhood may not be too different from the post-nationalist because both focus on a commonality and integration. In contrast, liberal nationalists believe that culture cannot be easily removed from the political process. They are skeptical that democratic institutions alone can increase the level of active participation among its citizens. In other words, they claim that a shared sense of cultural identity is not necessary but rather is directly linked to the political process. Without a cultural identity it is difficult to assume that democratic institutions alone will produce an active citizenry.
8/13/08
Facticity and Transcendence
I will continue my discussion of existentialism and in particular the explanation of the terms 'facticity' and 'transcendence'.
First of all, existentialists believe that there are two attitudes I can take towards myself:
1. The third person perspective
2. The first person perspective
Facticity is the third person perspective that any other person can take. These facts include biological facts about my height, weight, race, gender, skin color, eye color, etc. However, these facts also include social and economic, psychological and historical facts as well. Initially, I am unaware of my facticity as a child but I gradually learn over time that I have the capability to assume the third person or "I" perspective. With this gradual realization, I may come to assume that these factitious properties define who I am as an individual.
However, these properties and the fact that I possess them cannot define me as an individual because of the type of being that I am. This is true because the existence of a human being is defined by the perspective a human being takes on their factitious properties. Existentialist refer to this phenomena as transcendence.
Transcendence is the first person perspective of a human being. With transcendence, human beings can "transcend" their facticity and become something more than they are or seem to be. This "something" they can become is a result of that human beings individual choices or decisions. For the sake of argument, assume that the power suddenly goes out and I am unable to finish typing this particular paragraph. My reaction to this situation depends on beliefs about the situation itself. In other words, I can simply get angry and break the computer or can see this chance situation as an opportunity rather than a burden. The point is that we can determine our behavior in relation to a given situation or state of affairs. How I interpret my facticity will determine my reaction to these states of affairs. This also shows that even though we find ourselves in existence with certain innate dispositions, we are able to transcend them because our beliefs about those dispositions effect how we react to particular states of affairs.
Critics of existentialism are weary of the term “choice” because there are times when an individual does not even deliberate prior to a particular action. For example, if you just witnessed someone viciously murder your mother, you will not stand there and contemplate whether you should act or not. The question then is, “was this actually a choice?” Is this action reducible to the fact that I chose to feel anger towards my mother’s attacker? What this actually implies is that, I being the active "first person perceiver" cannot conceive of myself as determined by anything other than the third person perspective.
Existentialist believe that this is false and that facticity and transcendence are irreducible to one another. If this is true, then the Cartesian account of “being-in-the world” cannot be true. It is only through transcendence that the world is revealed and gives us meaning. Transcendence or “projects” can be factiously embedded in the world that is not of my own choosing. These projects are who I am as an engaged agent in the world.
First of all, existentialists believe that there are two attitudes I can take towards myself:
1. The third person perspective
2. The first person perspective
Facticity is the third person perspective that any other person can take. These facts include biological facts about my height, weight, race, gender, skin color, eye color, etc. However, these facts also include social and economic, psychological and historical facts as well. Initially, I am unaware of my facticity as a child but I gradually learn over time that I have the capability to assume the third person or "I" perspective. With this gradual realization, I may come to assume that these factitious properties define who I am as an individual.
However, these properties and the fact that I possess them cannot define me as an individual because of the type of being that I am. This is true because the existence of a human being is defined by the perspective a human being takes on their factitious properties. Existentialist refer to this phenomena as transcendence.
Transcendence is the first person perspective of a human being. With transcendence, human beings can "transcend" their facticity and become something more than they are or seem to be. This "something" they can become is a result of that human beings individual choices or decisions. For the sake of argument, assume that the power suddenly goes out and I am unable to finish typing this particular paragraph. My reaction to this situation depends on beliefs about the situation itself. In other words, I can simply get angry and break the computer or can see this chance situation as an opportunity rather than a burden. The point is that we can determine our behavior in relation to a given situation or state of affairs. How I interpret my facticity will determine my reaction to these states of affairs. This also shows that even though we find ourselves in existence with certain innate dispositions, we are able to transcend them because our beliefs about those dispositions effect how we react to particular states of affairs.
Critics of existentialism are weary of the term “choice” because there are times when an individual does not even deliberate prior to a particular action. For example, if you just witnessed someone viciously murder your mother, you will not stand there and contemplate whether you should act or not. The question then is, “was this actually a choice?” Is this action reducible to the fact that I chose to feel anger towards my mother’s attacker? What this actually implies is that, I being the active "first person perceiver" cannot conceive of myself as determined by anything other than the third person perspective.
Existentialist believe that this is false and that facticity and transcendence are irreducible to one another. If this is true, then the Cartesian account of “being-in-the world” cannot be true. It is only through transcendence that the world is revealed and gives us meaning. Transcendence or “projects” can be factiously embedded in the world that is not of my own choosing. These projects are who I am as an engaged agent in the world.
8/12/08
Existentialism
I will begin with a discussion of the work of Jean Paul Sartre. He begins by claiming that if God does not exist, then there is at least one being whose existence precedes his essence, namely human beings. When Sartre makes that claim that "existence precedes essence," he is simply saying that humans simply appear in this universe and initially humans are nothing but a "tabula rosa." In other words, human beings find themselves in existence and only later do they define themselves into something.
According to Sartre, the definition of what is means to exist as a human being is not predetermined because God does not exist. If God does not exist, then a higher consciousness which can conceive of a "human nature" does not exist either. Therefore, only human beings can define themselves through their will.
Clearly, then, man is simply what he wills himself to be. Critics of existentialism usually take this to mean that "everything is subjective." Sartre, on the other hand, believes that he is making the assertion that human beings have a greater dignity than simple, mundane objects (i.e rocks, mold,etc). Human beings are conscious of their existence in the universe and this is what distinguishes humans beings from these other objects. In other words, human beings can consciously plan what they want to be at some future point in time. Thus, like other mundane objects in the world, human beings are initially nothing but what distinguishes human beings from these other objects is that human beings can choose to become what they plan to be.
If existence really does precede essence, then each individual human being is responsible for who they are. This is an important feature of existentialism. The job of the existentialist, then, is to make other human beings aware of who they are and that they are responsible for who they are and have become. Furthermore, when the existentialist claims that all human beings are responsible for their own particular individuality, they are also claiming that each individual is also responsible for all of humanity.
Critics usually claim that existentialism is "purely subjective." However, the term 'subjective' carries two different meanings. In other words, the term 'subjective' can mean that human beings are free to choose who they want to be. On the other hand, the term 'subjective' can also mean that human beings are incapable of transcending their own subjectivity. The existentialist will point to the latter in response to such criticism.
The existentialist is making the claim that all human beings are unable to transcend their subjectivity. When an individual human being is making a choice, that individual is choosing all human beings. Every action we choose is simultaneously implying that we believe every human should pursue this course of action. When we are choosing, we are also choosing what we believe every human being ought to be.
When we make choices, we simultaneously affirm the value of these choices. This must be true if human nature does not exist. If human nature does not exist, then human beings cannot make wrong choices. Human beings will always choose the greatest good, and nothing is good for us, unless it is also good for everyone else.
Sartre makes the claim that "man is anguish." What he means by this is that individuals who involve themselves and are conscious of their choices, should feel a deep feeling of responsibility. This feeling of responsibility is inescapable because "man is condemned to be free." Even when an individual is not choosing, that in itself is actually a choice. Those individuals who claim to be unanxious are simply lying.
For the most part, human beings believe that when they are making a particular choice that it will only effect their own particular circumstances. However, existentialist believe that human beings should instead ask themselves, "what if everyone did this?" If everyone thought in this way is an inescapable fact. In response, most human beings will claim that "not everyone does this." But, by making this claim your act of lying implies that a universal value is conferred through a lie.
This anguish is present even when concealed. For example, many individuals will claim to have spoken with God or an angel. The problem with claims of this nature, is what proof or evidence do they have of this? How can the individual "know" they are speaking to God and not the devil? How can the individual "know" whether they are simply dreaming or hallucinating? The answer is that human beings will never have objective proof of these occurrences. Therefore, it is up to the individual to decide whether the voice they hear is coming from God or the devil or whether they are speaking to an angel or a demon. Whether the act is good or evil is up to the individual.
The individual must ask themselves, "if they have the right to act in such a way that humanity might guide itself through my actions?" If an individual does not ask themselves that question, then they are denying their anguish.
Sartre believes that because God does not exist and human beings are solely responsible for their actions, then a priori guidelines do not exist. In other words, if God does not exist, then human nature and morality do not exist as well. This is troubling for the existentialist because there is not a moral compass to guide our actions. In other words, there is nothing in the universe that tells us not to lie, steal, cheat or murder. Therefore, every action a human can perform is permissible. This only enhances the claim that "man is condemned to be free." If God (and thus, morality) do not exist, then human beings are solely responsible for their actions. If this is true then moral guidance does not exist and human beings are left without excuses for their actions.
If things are as man has willed them to be, does that mean that I should simply refrain from active participation in society? No, because I should involve myself and remember that nothing can be experienced without "doing." Human beings should do everything in their power when choosing. For instance, questions such as "will human beings ever stop mindlessly killing each other in wars?" or "will there ever be universal healthcare?" should not negate an individuals' pursuit to correct these states of affairs. To put another way, this means that an individual is simply a sum of his or her actions. In all probability, war, as we currently understand it, will probably not end in our lifetime. However, knowing this should not prevent an individual from doing all he or she can to end war. The point is that action is everything, even when an individual is choosing not to choose.
According to Sartre, the definition of what is means to exist as a human being is not predetermined because God does not exist. If God does not exist, then a higher consciousness which can conceive of a "human nature" does not exist either. Therefore, only human beings can define themselves through their will.
Clearly, then, man is simply what he wills himself to be. Critics of existentialism usually take this to mean that "everything is subjective." Sartre, on the other hand, believes that he is making the assertion that human beings have a greater dignity than simple, mundane objects (i.e rocks, mold,etc). Human beings are conscious of their existence in the universe and this is what distinguishes humans beings from these other objects. In other words, human beings can consciously plan what they want to be at some future point in time. Thus, like other mundane objects in the world, human beings are initially nothing but what distinguishes human beings from these other objects is that human beings can choose to become what they plan to be.
If existence really does precede essence, then each individual human being is responsible for who they are. This is an important feature of existentialism. The job of the existentialist, then, is to make other human beings aware of who they are and that they are responsible for who they are and have become. Furthermore, when the existentialist claims that all human beings are responsible for their own particular individuality, they are also claiming that each individual is also responsible for all of humanity.
Critics usually claim that existentialism is "purely subjective." However, the term 'subjective' carries two different meanings. In other words, the term 'subjective' can mean that human beings are free to choose who they want to be. On the other hand, the term 'subjective' can also mean that human beings are incapable of transcending their own subjectivity. The existentialist will point to the latter in response to such criticism.
The existentialist is making the claim that all human beings are unable to transcend their subjectivity. When an individual human being is making a choice, that individual is choosing all human beings. Every action we choose is simultaneously implying that we believe every human should pursue this course of action. When we are choosing, we are also choosing what we believe every human being ought to be.
When we make choices, we simultaneously affirm the value of these choices. This must be true if human nature does not exist. If human nature does not exist, then human beings cannot make wrong choices. Human beings will always choose the greatest good, and nothing is good for us, unless it is also good for everyone else.
Sartre makes the claim that "man is anguish." What he means by this is that individuals who involve themselves and are conscious of their choices, should feel a deep feeling of responsibility. This feeling of responsibility is inescapable because "man is condemned to be free." Even when an individual is not choosing, that in itself is actually a choice. Those individuals who claim to be unanxious are simply lying.
For the most part, human beings believe that when they are making a particular choice that it will only effect their own particular circumstances. However, existentialist believe that human beings should instead ask themselves, "what if everyone did this?" If everyone thought in this way is an inescapable fact. In response, most human beings will claim that "not everyone does this." But, by making this claim your act of lying implies that a universal value is conferred through a lie.
This anguish is present even when concealed. For example, many individuals will claim to have spoken with God or an angel. The problem with claims of this nature, is what proof or evidence do they have of this? How can the individual "know" they are speaking to God and not the devil? How can the individual "know" whether they are simply dreaming or hallucinating? The answer is that human beings will never have objective proof of these occurrences. Therefore, it is up to the individual to decide whether the voice they hear is coming from God or the devil or whether they are speaking to an angel or a demon. Whether the act is good or evil is up to the individual.
The individual must ask themselves, "if they have the right to act in such a way that humanity might guide itself through my actions?" If an individual does not ask themselves that question, then they are denying their anguish.
Sartre believes that because God does not exist and human beings are solely responsible for their actions, then a priori guidelines do not exist. In other words, if God does not exist, then human nature and morality do not exist as well. This is troubling for the existentialist because there is not a moral compass to guide our actions. In other words, there is nothing in the universe that tells us not to lie, steal, cheat or murder. Therefore, every action a human can perform is permissible. This only enhances the claim that "man is condemned to be free." If God (and thus, morality) do not exist, then human beings are solely responsible for their actions. If this is true then moral guidance does not exist and human beings are left without excuses for their actions.
If things are as man has willed them to be, does that mean that I should simply refrain from active participation in society? No, because I should involve myself and remember that nothing can be experienced without "doing." Human beings should do everything in their power when choosing. For instance, questions such as "will human beings ever stop mindlessly killing each other in wars?" or "will there ever be universal healthcare?" should not negate an individuals' pursuit to correct these states of affairs. To put another way, this means that an individual is simply a sum of his or her actions. In all probability, war, as we currently understand it, will probably not end in our lifetime. However, knowing this should not prevent an individual from doing all he or she can to end war. The point is that action is everything, even when an individual is choosing not to choose.
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